



Security Aspects in 5G framework – The SESAME Conceptual Framework



The 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership



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Overview

- A **novel architecture**, proposed for next-generation cellular networks will be presented. This architecture benefits from the recent advances in Software Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) which are natively integrated into the new and novel architecture.
- Approach based on EU-funded 5G SESAME project.
- SESAME aims at providing a fresh 5G mobile network architecture so as to support the ambitious goal of small cell virtualization, multitenancy and edge cloud services.
The present work proposes a framework for security analysis applied in virtualised Small Cell (SC) Networks, with the aim of further extending MEC in the broader 5G environment.

SDN & NFV

NFV provides several benefits such as:

- **SDN controllers** evolved operation and management of the network infrastructure
 - **SDN helps virtualization** of the network infrastructure by facilitating isolation, abstraction and sharing of network resources
- efficient management of hardware resources
 - rapid introduction of new functions and services to the market
 - ease to upgrade and maintenance
 - exploitation of existing virtualization and cloud management technologies for VNF deployment
 - reduction of CAPEX and OPEX
 - enables a more diverse ecosystem
 - encourages openness

Mobile Edge Computing (MEC)

- Decoupling control and data planes and abstracting network functions from physical infrastructure, brings greater flexibility to efficiently utilize radio and computing resources both in the Radio Access Network (RAN) as well as in the Mobile Core Network (MCN).
- ***MEC or “Fog computing”, is a novel concept that extends the services, provided by the Cloud, to the network edge.***
- The available MEC infrastructure allows applications to run closer to the end user. *This is expected to reduce the E2E network latency and to reduce the backhaul capacity requirements. Moreover, it enables better QoE of fast moving EUs, facilitates highly-interactive real-time applications, and even the emergence of novel applications, such as the Tactile Internet.*

Initial Problem Definition for cloud – High Level

- **Everything goes cloud**

- Consumer data like our emails or photos (google mail and other google services)
- Public administration IT services
- Soon all kinds of applications (incl. Critical Infrastructure - CI)

- **Requirements for cloud applications vary**

- Commercial applications mainly focus on scalability & elasticity
- Other Requirements regarding: overall redundancy, data availability, authenticity, secure access, trust and protection of the citizens are typically higher than in commercial applications.

- **What is the problem?**

- Cloud services abstract over used resources, are opaque and make it hard to
 - *determine **technical** reasons for (security) failure and hence make the*
 - *development of countermeasures*
- This also implies, from a **legal** perspective, that it is hard to
 - *determine who's fault it is and*
 - *to show one hasn't acted negligent*

Existing Work on security and privacy for MEC (1/2)

- **A number of security and privacy challenges of MEC have already been identified.**
- The considered **security threats** are mainly in the context of a cloud-enabled IoT (Internet of Things) environment. The study makes a classification of the available security technologies according to the involved network elements, such as technologies to secure a fog node (*i.e., the MEC server*) and an IoT node, as well as techniques to protect the communication.
- Other threats on the existing security mechanisms:
 - *man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack and*
 - *malicious fog node problem.*
- Assessment of authentication and authorization techniques **for connecting the fog with the cloud.**
- The applicability of existing techniques, such as **signature- and anomaly-based intrusion detection**

Existing Work on security and privacy for MEC (2/2)


- **Challenges of MEC with respect to digital forensics** (sensors and various types of smart objects that require connectivity to the cloud and to each other)
- Processes and events that would allow reconstructing past activity for providing digital evidence.
- **Distinction between the techniques** that can be applied in both fog and cloud, and between those that are only applicable in one of them.
- Existing data protection techniques and their suitability in MEC.
- The conferred data theft attacks include both external intrusion as well as insider attacks.

5G Concept

5G is expected to assist an entirely mobile and fully connected and converged society

New capabilities of 5G dimensions

- flexibility, lower energy requirements
- improved energy efficiency,
- greater capacity, bandwidth, security, reliability and data rates,
- enhanced indoor coverage
- lower latency and device costs



Source: <http://5g-ppp.eu/about-us>

SESAME- Actors (1/2)


End User (EU): Mobile device.

Infrastructure Owner (IO): Owner of cellular infrastructure, (SCs, macro BS).

IT Equipment Vendor (ITEV): Entity who develops, manufactures or sells IT equipment(e.g.: BSs).

Small Cell Network Operator (SCNO): An entity that possesses equipment so as to provide radio communications services and that provides radio access to end-users locally, by using SCs.

Virtual Small Cell Network Operator (VSCNO): This entity does not possess the equipment but leases it from another one, so as to provide radio communications services and to deliver services to EUs.



SESAME- Actors (2/2)

Macro- Cell Network Operator (MCNO): This possesses the equipment so as to provide radio communications services and provides radio access to EUs in wide areas at the macro cell level.

Backhaul Provider (BP): An entity that provides backhauling of the Small Cells and Macro Cells (e.g. ISP, MNO).

Service Provider (SP): An entity that produces, controls and distributes services over the MNO/VMNO.

Virtual Function Provider (VFP): This supplies virtual network functions (gateways, proxies, and transcoders). In this way, the need for the customer to acquire, install and maintain specialized hardware is essentially eliminated.

Spectrum Owner (SO): This entity owns a particular piece of spectrum in a given geographical area.

SESAME functional architecture (1/2)

MEC server: It is specialized hardware placed inside SC, that provides processing power, memory and storage capabilities and networking resources.

Cloud Enabled Small Cell (CESC): It is a SC device which has been enriched with a MEC server;

CESC cluster: A group of CESC's able to exchange Information.


Light Data Center (Light DC): It is a cluster of MEC servers. This is a logical entity consisting of a set of distributed MEC servers of the same CESC cluster.

Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM): This manages virtual hardware (i.e., VMs) and networking resources of a single Light DC. The VIM is also responsible for the allocation of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) over the hardware.

CESC Manager (CESCM): This is the architectural component in charge of managing and orchestrating the cloud environment of the Light DC; it can simultaneously manage multiple clusters, a cluster or a single CESC.

The CESC Manager also manages the radio access and "Self-x" functionalities.

SESAME functional architecture (2/2)



Security and Privacy Considerations

Security will be a fundamental enabling factor of future 5G networks.

Secure Tropos (SecTro): A methodology used to identify, model and analyse security issues from the early stages of system design and software development as well as to model and analyse threats and vulnerabilities in existing software

A cloud provider must ensure the physical security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure and of the data centres.

Cryptographic and privacy protection techniques need to ensure confidentiality and integrity of User Equipment (UE) data.

Security and Privacy Considerations in SESAME concept (1/2)

SESAME concepts can provide invaluable opportunities of developing solutions for attack prevention, management & recovery.

- *Physical security of CESC has to be ensured*
- *Attacks initiated from the cloud side* (especially when multiple enterprises using private clouds are hosted)
- *Emerging Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) trend* constitutes another threat
- *Recommendations from the Cloud Security Alliance* should be followed
- *Adopted Public-Key scheme* that enables the encryption of the communications among CESC, UE and the cloud, must be sufficiently secure.
- *Cryptographic and privacy protection techniques* are particularly important in cases where an EU receives service from multiple service or network providers, due to mobility or QoE considerations.

Security and Privacy Considerations in SESAME concept (2/2)

SESAME concepts can provide invaluable opportunities of developing solutions for attack prevention, management & recovery.

- **NFV Orchestrator is an attractive attack target** due to being in the “middle” of the system model architecture;
- So is VNF Manager.
- Considering virtualised environment, **both host and guest Operating Systems (OSs) may be targeted and to alleviate the impact of such attack**, adequate isolation must be enforced between guest VMs, as well as between the host and guest VMs.
- **Identifying and mitigating security threats and vulnerabilities at the intersection of MEC with “Small Cells-as a-Service” (SCaaS), SDN, and NFV is crucial.**

Enabling Large Multi-tenant Enterprise Services by Using MEC (1/2)

SCNO provides radio interface to mobile operators, virtual mobile network operators (VMNOs) and VSCNOs.

SCNO may transmit by using licensed or unlicensed spectrum

SCNO offers a platform for MEC for low latency and compute intensive applications.

MOs, VMNOs and VSCNOs provide both in-house and third party services from OTT players or the SPs.

CESC is comprised of:

Hardware resources:

Virtualization layer: abstracts the hardware resources and decouples the VNF software from hardware

VNFs: virtualization of a network function in a legacy non-virtualised network

Element Management System (EMS): performs management of one or more VNFs.

A cluster of CESC is managed by the CESC that constitutes of:

VIM: manages the interaction of a VNF with the compute, storage and network resources under its specific authority.

VNF manager: is responsible for VNF management.

Network functions virtualisation orchestrator (NFVO): is in charge of orchestration, of management NFV infrastructure and software resources and of realizing network services.


Enabling Large Multi-tenant Enterprise Services by Using MEC (2/2)

A CESC provider has Service Level Agreement (SLA)

The deployment of MEC servers with high processing capabilities can enable close-to-zero latency and enhanced QoE of the enterprise users. MEC servers can provide storage resources and support content caching at the network edge.

This scenario will leverage on SESAME features *-such as multi-tenancy-* by enabling multiple Small Cells operators to provide network services and connectivity over the network owned by a single CESC infrastructure provider.

Backhauling is required.



Security analysis of UC: View of CESC provider


Hypervisor and Tenant's Data need to be protected
A resource must achieve a specific “goal” of an actor (CESC provider). **These goals (green)** require the Hypervisor as a primary resource. To enable multi-tenancy, the Tenant's Data resource has to be created. A goal could be restricted by a “**security constraint**” (**red octagon**).
Various security constraints must satisfy a number of “security objectives” (**blue hexagons**).

Security constraints are satisfied by the two objectives: **Protect the Control Plane** and **Prevent Access to another Tenant's VM**.
These objectives are implemented by using a number of “**security mechanisms**” (**green hexagons**).

“**Threats**” (**pentagons**) impact resources.

Hypervisor has two threats: **Control Hijacking** and **Denial of Service**.

Tenant's Data resource can be impacted by the **Eavesdropping** threat.



A number of threats could impact the considered resources, such as **DoS, control hijacking** and **radio jamming attacks**.



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SESAME Project website:

<http://www.sesame-h2020-5g-ppp.eu/>